Driver & Firmware Archive for NVLink‑enabled SiFive Boards

Stop chasing broken links and unsigned binaries — a verified driver & firmware archive for NVLink‑enabled SiFive boards

If you're managing RISC‑V systems or building AI appliances with SiFive SoCs and Nvidia NVLink Fusion in 2026, you need one thing first: trusted, verifiable binaries. This guide is a curated, actionable archive and playbook for SiFive boards with NVLink support — signed firmware, kernel patches, and utility tools with integrity checks and automation patterns you can use in production.

Why this matters now (short answer)

Hardware/software supply‑chain attacks, increasing RISC‑V adoption, and the 2025 NVLink Fusion announcements (SiFive + Nvidia) mean your datacenter nodes will increasingly require RISC‑V/NVLink stacks. That increases attack surface and operational complexity: firmware versions, signed drivers, kernel ABI changes, and tooling for NVLink diagnostics all matter. This archive focuses on verifiability (GPG/sigstore), reproducibility (checksums and release manifests), and operability (patches, DKMS, utilities) so you can deploy with confidence.

What's in this archive (at a glance)

• Signed firmware images for SiFive NVLink‑enabled boards (UEFI and SOC firmware, canonical filenames and versioning)
• Kernel patches and backports compatible with Linux 6.x/7.x (2026 kernels), with git tags and patch bundles
• NVLink utilities: diagnostics, link bringup, PCIe/NVLink topology tools, and vendor helper scripts
• Driver packages (prebuilt .deb/.rpm and source tarballs), and DKMS modules where possible
• Release manifests (.sha256, .sha512, .asc, cosign proofs, and Rekor entries)
• Verification guides and CI integration snippets (sigstore/cosign, GPG, reproducible-build checks)

Key 2026 trends that shaped this archive

• NVLink Fusion adoption — SiFive and Nvidia's integration announced in late 2025 means SiFive boards now need validated NVLink stacks.
• Sigstore & cosign become standard: by 2026 many vendors publish artifact signatures and Rekor entries; this archive mirrors and verifies them.
• Kernel module signing & Secure Boot are mandatory in many environments; we provide signed modules and guidance for enrolling keys.
• SBOMs and attestations — software bills of materials are distributed with every release to aid audits and vulnerability scanning.

How the archive guarantees integrity (practical checklist)

1. All binaries have SHA256+SHA512 checksums and a signed manifest file (.sha256.asc)
2. Critical artifacts (firmware, kernel modules) are signed using either vendor GPG keys and/or sigstore/cosign with Rekor transparency entries
3. Source is published with git tags, annotated signatures (git tag -s), and reproducible build instructions
4. Release notes include CVE references, build environment, and SBOM (CycloneDX or SPDX)
5. Multiple HTTPS mirrors and rsync endpoints, with torrent fallback and explicit legal notices where applicable

Step‑by‑step: Verify a signed firmware image (example workflow)

Use this exact sequence in your CI or on your admin workstation.

1. Download files using secure transport (curl or aria2c). Example:

> curl -fL -o sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz https://archive.filesdownloads.net/sifive/nvlink/sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz
> curl -fL -o sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256 https://archive.filesdownloads.net/sifive/nvlink/sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256
> curl -fL -o sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256.asc https://archive.filesdownloads.net/sifive/nvlink/sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256.asc

2. Verify the checksum locally:

> sha256sum -c sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256
sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz: OK

3. Fetch the vendor signing key from a trusted channel (key fingerprint must be vetted against vendor documentation). Example uses a published fingerprint and the keyserver as a fallback:

> gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --recv-keys 0xAB12CD34EF56AB78
> gpg --with-fingerprint AB12CD34EF56AB78

4. Verify the manifest signature:

> gpg --verify sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256.asc sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256
gpg: Signature made ... using RSA key ID EF56AB78
gpg: Good signature from "SiFive Release Signing Key <releases@sifive.com>"

5. Optionally verify cosign/sigstore entries for the exact artifact digest (recommended in automated CI):

> cosign verify --key https://fulcio.sifive.example/public-key.pem --cert  
# or check Rekor transparency log entry ID in the release manifest

Notes & gotchas

• If GPG key is not on a public keyserver, pull the key fingerprint from the vendor's HTTPS page (TLS) and import from a hermetic key bundle delivered via package manager metadata or Sigstore.
• Never trust a checksum delivered on the same server over HTTP. Always use HTTPS + signed manifest.

Applying kernel patches for NVLink (concise, proven workflow)

We publish kernel patches as signed git bundles and .patch files. Use this pattern for reproducible results.

Quick patch apply (for a build host)

> # Clone the canonical Linux tree (or your vendor branch)
> git clone https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux
> cd linux
> git remote add sifive https://archive.filesdownloads.net/sifive/nvlink/linux-sifive.git
> git fetch sifive --tags
> git checkout -b sifive-nvlink-2026 sifive/sifive-nvlink-2026
> # Apply single patch
> git am /path/to/0001-nvlink-add-support.patch

Patch bundle approach (recommended for reproducibility)

1. Download signed patch bundle (patches-2026.01.1.tar.gz + .asc)
2. Verify signature and checksums (see earlier section)
3. Apply with git am --signoff --whitespace=fix

Build and install

> make -j$(nproc) defconfig
> # enable required NVLink/SiFive options in .config or use oldconfig
> make -j$(nproc)
> sudo make modules_install install

For production nodes, build a binary package (deb/rpm) using the distro packaging toolchain and sign the package with your repo key.

Signed driver modules & Secure Boot

Most datacenter environments enforce Secure Boot. We publish kernel modules signed both by vendors and with instructions for administrators to enroll keys via MOK (Machine Owner Key) or the platform firmware.

Sign a kernel module locally (example)

> # Generate keys once (on an airgapped admin host)
> openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout MOK.priv -outform DER -out MOK.der -nodes -days 3650 -subj "/CN=Admin MOK/"
> # Sign module
> /usr/src/linux-headers-$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file sha256 MOK.priv MOK.der .ko

Enroll the key

> sudo mokutil --import MOK.der
# Reboot and follow MokManager to enroll the key

For environments using vendor-signed modules, we provide the vendor public keys and recommend enrolling them into the firmware's PK/KEK/MOK as appropriate. The archive also includes sbsign/sbverify signed EFI binaries for UEFI Secure Boot file integrity.

Automating verification in CI/CD (recommended 2026 pattern)

Use sigstore/cosign + Rekor for automated artifact verification. Example GitHub Actions or GitLab CI steps:

1. Download artifact with enforced HTTPS and retry rules (curl/aria2)
2. Verify manifest signature (GPG) or cosign verify against trusted public key URL
3. Check SHA512 digest locally and compare with manifest
4. Start an ephemeral VM/container that executes a smoke test (NVLink bringup) in QEMU or on a hardware testbed

# pseudo CI script fragment
curl -fL -o artifact.tgz $ARTIFACT_URL
sha512sum -c artifact.tgz.sha512
gpg --verify artifact.tgz.sha512.asc artifact.tgz.sha512
cosign verify --key $COSIGN_KEY artifact.tgz || exit 1
# Run smoke tests
./nvlink-smoketest.sh artifact.tgz

Archive layout & naming conventions (what to expect)

Consistent layout reduces mistakes. Example structure we use:

• /sifive/nvlink/2026.01.1/
  • sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz
  • sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256
  • sfw-2026.01.1.img.gz.sha256.asc
  • kernel-patches-2026.01.1.tar.gz
  • kernel-patches-2026.01.1.tar.gz.sha256
  • drivers-deb-2026.01.1.deb
  • drivers-deb-2026.01.1.deb.sig
  • sbom-2026.01.1.cdx.json
  • release-notes-2026.01.1.md

Every release directory includes a RELEASE_MANIFEST.json that enumerates artifacts, sizes, checksums, signature fingerprints, Rekor entry IDs, and SBOM links.

Release notes & CVE tracking (how we document risk)

Each release includes an explicit section listing:

• New features and breaking changes
• Fixed CVEs (with links to NVD or vendor advisories)
• Backported fixes and affected kernels
• SBOM with component versions
• Recommended upgrade procedure and rollbacks

Example excerpt from a 2026 release note:

Fixed CVE‑2025‑XXXXX: NVLink link state denial of service — patched in kernel 6.5.21‑sifive. Backport included for 6.1.y and 6.4.y.

Case study: Deploying NVLink firmware to 100 nodes (real‑world pattern)

Context: A research cluster transitioned to SiFive NVLink boards in Q4 2025. They needed an atomic, auditable firmware upgrade across 100 bare‑metal nodes with minimal downtime.

Procedure we used

1. Staged upgrade on a 3‑node canary farm using kexec for fast rollback.
2. Automated downloads with aria2c (parallel mirrors) and verification via cosign + SHA512 in CI sandbox.
3. Firmware signed with vendor key; verified via Rekor; hardware acceptance smoke test executed (link training and throughput check).
4. Rolling upgrade using orchestration (Ansible playbooks that call fwupd or vendor CLI). Each node logs the firmware digest and verification result into central monitoring (Elasticsearch).
5. Post‑upgrade audits: SBOM reconciliation and vulnerability scan run in Nexus IQ/Trivy against installed artifacts.

Outcome: Zero production outages and a precise audit trail (checksums, Rekor entries, syslogs) for compliance.

Developer & admin utilities included in the archive

• nvlink-topology: prints link status, lane counters, and ECC stats
• nvlink-flash: safe firmware flashing with rollback header and signature verification before write
• nvlink-sim: small QEMU module to test link bringup logic in CI
• pkg-dkms templates for building modules across kernel versions
• mok-enroll helper script to bootstrap MOK enrollment for fleet deployments

Security & compliance checklist (for Auditors)

• All artifacts must have at least one independent signature (GPG or cosign) and corresponding transparency entry.
• SBOM present and machine‑readable.
• Release notes list CVEs, fixes, and any configuration changes.
• Build environment documented (container images, distro base, build flags) for reproducibility.
• Mirrors over HTTPS only; rsync/FTP only as an archived fallback with manifest verification.

Troubleshooting: common issues and fixes

Failed GPG verification

• Ensure you have the vendor key fingerprint from an out‑of‑band channel (vendor site over TLS or published key telemetry).
• Check for CRLF/line ending problems in manifest files (use dos2unix).

Kernel build fails after applying patches

• Confirm your toolchain (GCC/Clang) matches the documented build environment.
• Check for missing backports; use our backport bundle for older kernels.

NVLink link won’t train

• Validate firmware match on both endpoints and verify link firmware versions with nvlink-topology.
• Run CRC/ECC counters; if counters increment quickly, open a ticket with the vendor and attach logs and checksums.

Integration tips: adding this archive to automation

1. Mirror a subset you use with rsync and enable signing on your mirror. Sync both artifacts and manifests.
2. Use a local Rekor instance if you operate offline; archive Rekor entries with artifact manifests.
3. Embed verification into your provisioning pipeline: download → verify → smoke test → install.

Future directions and predictions (through 2028)

• Greater use of artifact transparency logs: By 2028, most firmware vendors will publish to vendor‑managed Rekor mirrors to reduce supply‑chain risk.
• Hardware‑backed attestations for firmware: TPM/SEV style attestations for firmware bundles will become common in rack‑scale nodes.
• More automation around SBOM enforcement: Fleet managers will require SBOM gating in provisioning pipelines.
• Unified NVLink toolsets: Expect a cross‑vendor diagnostic standard for NVLink and accelerators to emerge in 2026–2027.

Where to get help and how to contribute

If you find a mismatch in checksums, a missing signature, or a broken patch:

• Open an issue in the archive tracker (link included in every release directory)
• Attach failing digest, output of sha256sum, gpg --verify output, and your release manifest
• Contribute patches by opening a signed pull request against the kernel patch repo; use git format-patch for maintainers

Actionable takeaways (do these first)

1. Subscribe to the archive RSS or mirror feed to receive release notifications and Rekor entry IDs.
2. Import vendor signing keys via an out‑of‑band channel and pin fingerprints in your CI.
3. Build a small canary farm to test firmware and kernel patches before rolling out at scale.
4. Automate verification with sigstore/cosign + sha512 checksums in your pipeline.

Final notes on trust

Trust is earned through reproducibility and transparency. Signed artifacts, public release manifests, SBOMs, and transparency logs are the practical guarantees you can use today.

We curate this archive with an operator mindset: verifiable binaries, clear provenance, and deployable tooling. Whether you run a lab with a handful of SiFive NVLink boards or manage a production AI cluster, these patterns will reduce risk and shorten mean time to repair.

Call to action: Visit the archive, verify the latest SiFive NVLink release using the steps above, and subscribe to receive signed manifests and Rekor logs. If you manage fleet deployments, clone our Ansible playbooks and run the canary upgrade today — and report mismatches or missing signatures to the archive issue tracker to keep the supply chain auditable for everyone.

Related Reading

• Invest Now: 10 Clothing Pieces that Elevate Your Beauty Routine
• Pitching to Streamers in EMEA: How to Tailor Your Danish Series for Disney+, Netflix and Vice
• Process Roulette & Chaos Engineering: Using Controlled Process Killers to Test Resilience
• Create a Friendlier Pet Community: Lessons from New Social Platforms and Digg’s Paywall-Free Model
• Political Guests as Ratings Strategy: When Daytime TV Crosses Into Auditioning